AN ARABIC VERSION OF LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM’S
THIRTY CHAPTERS

Among the treatises contained in Arabic codex 549 of the Bibliothèque orientale in Beirut is found a certain refutation of the Monophysites, entitled Qawl radd ’alā al-Tawdūsīyah ay al-Ya’llaqibah fi al-ṭabi‘ah al-wāhidah (A Refutation of the Theodosians [i.e. the Jacobites] concerning the One Nature). Even though this tract is transmitted anonymously, Louis Cheikho suspected that it may have been written by Theodore Abū Qurrah. He nowhere gave reasons for this ascription; one can deduce, however, that he drew this conclusion because the tract was closely preceded by a treatise of Abū Qurrah and likewise was followed by two treatises of the same. Joseph Nasrallah questioned the validity of Cheikho’s conclusions, listing this tract against the Theodosians among a series of anonymous polemical treatises of the later tenth through mid-thirteenth centuries, but giving no reasons for his choice of date.

This refutation of the Theodosians was certainly not written by Theodore Abū Qurrah, nor does it stem from the high middle ages; it is, in fact, an Arabic translation of Leontius of Byzantium’s Thirty Chapters. That this has so far escaped notice is understandable: not only is the tract transmitted anonymously, but also it begins with the second of Leontius’ thirty chapters and concludes in the middle of chapter twenty-four.

The text merits publication first and foremost for the light it sheds on the textual tradition of Leontius’ Thirty Chapters. Its significance is further highlighted by the relative paucity of Neo-Chalcedonian Christological works to be translated into Arabic. More popular among the

1 Catalogue raisonné des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Orientale (Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph, XI, 5), Beirut, 1926, p. 239. The refutation of the Theodosians is found on pages 214-221 of the manuscript.


Melkites living under Arab rule were the grand dogmatic syntheses of the later sixth through eighth centuries, works by such theologians as Maximus the Confessor⁴, Anastasius of Sinai⁵, and John of Damascus⁶. Such texts provided ready handbooks with easily accessible treatments of dogmatic issues, in comparison to the works of Neo-Chalcedonian theologians, which were tentative and highly technical attempts at bringing together the heritages of Cyril of Alexandria and the Fourth Ecumenical Council. This is not to say that the sixth century left no legacy among the Melkites. Works of asceticism and hagiography were widely translated and read: texts such as the *Quaestiones et responsiones* by Barsanuphius and John⁷, the *Pratum spirituale* of John Moschus⁸, as well as Cyril of Scythopolis’ lives of the founders of Palestinian monasticism⁹.

The *Thirty Chapters* are a highly abstract and extremely laconic series of syllogisms directed against the Monophysites. Their author, the most scholastic of sixth-century Chalcedonians, was concerned in this text to refute the Christology of the Monophysites in its Severian formulation¹⁰. The later popularity of the text is confirmed by its fairly wide circulation among Byzantine theologians. The whole of the text is subsumed in the anti-Monothelite florilegium, the *Doctrina patrum*¹¹; much of it is also found in Euthymius Zigabenus’ *Panoplia dogmatica*¹². In the opinion of Nicephorus Kallistos Xanthopoulos (d.c. 1335), writing about sixth-century attempts to refute the Monophysites: “Many others opposed the [Monophysites]; but most of all, the monk Leontius in an excellent manner set up a whole book against them in a [mere] thirty chapters, which utterly overtops their heresy, while at the same time greatly

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¹² *PG* 130, col. 1068-1073.
strengthening our own pious doctrine”\textsuperscript{13}. According to Brian Daley, of all the works in Leontius’ corpus, it was this text which “seems to have been … best known … in the Byzantine world”\textsuperscript{14}.

We need not here rehearse the themes set forth by Leontius in the \textit{Thirty Chapters}: these will be explicated within the notes to our translation. As for the quality of the Arabic version, it varies greatly from chapter to chapter, sometimes being an accurate, even graceful, representation of the Greek, at other times being periphrastic to such an extent as to obscure the terse logic of Leontius’ thought – though admittedly such infelicities may stem from the rather poor manuscript base of the text as presently preserved\textsuperscript{15}. Where the Arabic version is excessively periphrastic, it is hard to ascribe this to anything other than the whims of the translator: for one can discern no theological reasons for this, neither can one attribute it to an ignorance of Greek (excepting a few cases, as will be pointed out in the notes to the translation).

There are two main stems in the manuscript tradition of the \textit{Thirty Chapters}\textsuperscript{16}: (i) that represented by the recension contained in the \textit{Doctrina patrum}, mss A (\textit{Vaticanus Graecus} 2200, saec. XI), C (\textit{Oxoniensis Miscellaneous Graecus} 184, saec. xii), and D (\textit{Parisinus Graecus} 1144, saec. xv), and (ii) that represented by mss V (\textit{Vaticanus Graecus} 2195, saec. x) and O (\textit{Oxoniensis Laudianus Graecus} 92b, saec. x)\textsuperscript{17}. The Arabic version very seldom agrees with the Greek recension preserved in the \textit{Doctrina patrum} (ACD). Among many passages that could be pointed to in evidence of this, note the following three: (i) in ACD the order of chapters nine and ten are reversed, not so the Arabic version; (ii) at 98.16 [1901C] ACD omits τὸν Χριστόν, not so the Arabic (3.1); and (iii) at 99.10-11 [1904A] ACD substitutes αὐτόν for τὸν Χριστόν, not so the Arabic (6.1). When the translation is being literal, it usually agrees with the recension of VO. Moreover, the Arabic often agrees with V over against the occasional variants of O: for example, at 100.13-14 [1904D] O omits the phrase εἰ δὲ ἄει τὸ δεύτερον ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας, which is, however, present in the Arabic, though it is rather periphrastic\textsuperscript{18}.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Hist. Eccl.} 18.48 (\textit{PG} 147, col. 428).
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Leontius of Byzantium}, p. xxxix.
\textsuperscript{15} As examples of the two extremes, compare chapters three and seventeen.
\textsuperscript{16} As one gathers from the critical apparatus to B. Daley’s edition of Leontius’ \textit{Thirty Chapters}, p. 98-108 [1901B-1916B].
\textsuperscript{17} In ms O there are two large lacune in the text of the \textit{Thirty Chapters} (from 98.1-99.23 [1901B-1904B], and from 103.7-104.26 [1908D-1909C]). The recension preserved in Euthymius Zigabenus more often than not agrees with ACD.
\textsuperscript{18} wa-in kāna al-thānī maqāl ‘ālā sayyidinā wa-ilāhinā Yasū’ al-Masīḥ (12.3).
The Arabic version of Leontius’ *Thirty Chapters* is found in just two manuscripts, both of rather late provenance. As mentioned above, the first of these is Arabic 549 of the Bibliothèque orientale. Copied in AM 7162 (AD 1654), it was bequeathed to the Greek church of St. George in Beirut shortly thereafter, as noted on pages 252 and 645 of the manuscript by Philip, the Orthodox Bishop of Beirut (1651 - post 1673). It was purchased in Beirut by the Bibliothèque orientale in 1919. Written in a regular *naskhī*, it consists of 646 pages and contains diverse Christian Arabic treatises, many of a polemical nature. Among the more important of these are ones by Paul Rāhib of Antioch, Theodore Abū Qurrah, John of Damascus, and ’Abd Allāh b. al-Fadl. The text here edited is found on folios 109r-112r (according to the foliation written in a later hand at the bottom of the page) or pages 214-221 (according to the pagination of Cheikho’s catalogue). In the edition which follows this manuscript is referred to as *ba‘*.

The second manuscript utilized is in the possession of the Denver Public Library, being acquired on 21 May 1907 from Dr. John Lansing, former professor of Old Testament at the Theological Seminary of the Dutch Reformed Church in New Brunswick, New Jersey. It contains 292 pages of a fairly clear *naskhī*. The manuscript was copied in the year AM 7233 (AD 1741, if in the mundane era of Antioch; AD 1725, if in the Constantinopolitan era) by “the priest Michael, son of the revered priest Joseph.” The manuscript contains a number of Christian Arabic theological treatises by diverse authors: John of Damascus, Dionysius the Areopagite, Theodore Abū Qurrah, Hierotheus the Companion of Dionysius, and ‘Abd Allāh b. al-Fadl. The text here edited is found on pages 58-65. In the edition which follows this manuscript is referred to as *alif*.

The Arabic of the text is fairly strong. Most of the deviations from standard Arabic concern points of orthography. These, being of little philological interest, were tacitly standardized. Neither did it seem necessary to record orthographic variations between the manuscripts.

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20 Colophon, p. 292.

21 The contents have been described by C.D. Matthews, *Manuscripts and a Mamlûk Inscription in the Lansing Collection in the Denver Public Library*, in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 60 (1940), p. 370-382, esp. p. 373-376 (no III).

22 This was necessary in just a select number of cases, generally with regard to: (i) the orthography of the *hamzah*, (ii) VIIIth forms of initial *wāw* roots, (iii) active participles (both singular and plural) of final *wāw/yāʾ* roots, and (iv) *alif maṣṣūrah*.

23 Where both mss preserve forms that are possible in standard Arabic, preference was given to ms *alif*: e.g., *mithlāmā/mithla mā, ka-īnnā/ka-īnā, li-ānnā/lī-ānnā, wa-ānnahum/wa-īnna hum*. 
Whenever it was necessary to correct the Arabic in matters other than orthography, the reading of the mss was always given in the notes\textsuperscript{24}. At times corrections could not be made without altering the structure of the original: in such cases errors in the text were allowed to remain. Some vocalization was added where this might facilitate reading; this was especially important where the text follows the structure of the Greek rather than good Arabic style. Modern punctuation was added; the text was divided into chapters (corresponding to the divisions of the Greek) and sections\textsuperscript{25}.

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\textsuperscript{24} Most corrections concern the use of moods and cases. Whatever variations from standard Arabic one finds are well attested in Christian Arabic texts, cf. J. Blau, \textit{A Grammar of Christian Arabic} (C.S.C.O. 267, 276, 279; Sub. 27-29), Louvain, 1966-1967; B. Holmberg ed., \textit{A Treatise on the Unity and Trinity of God by Israel of Kashkar (d. 872)}, (Lund Studies in African and Asian Religions, 3), Lund, 1989, p. 120-125.

\textsuperscript{25} I would like to thank Martin McDermott S.J. of the Bibliothèque orientale for providing a copy of Arabic ms 549; Ms. Elenor Gehres of the Denver Public Library, for a copy of the Denver manuscript; and Prof. Brian Daley, for selections from his unpublished edition of the Greek works of Leontius. Thanks also to Mr. Sa’d Sa’di of Aleppo for a number of helpful suggestions regarding the Arabic of this treatise.
قول رد على التاويةيسية أي اليعاقبة في الطبيعة الواحدة.

[3:1] الأشياء التي طبيعية واحدة، فكلمتها ونسبتاهما مشتركة، والأشياء التي كلامتها ونسبتاهما مشتركة، فوجودها يتشمل على تساوية فيها بينها في الجوه.

[2:1] ولاهوت المسيح، فليس عندهم مساوية في الجوهر بشرته، فكلمتها إذا ونسبتاهما ليست واحدة، ومن ليس كلامته ونسبتاهما واحدة، فطاعتهما مختلفة.


A Refutation of the Theodosians

(i.e., the Jacobites)
Concerning the One Nature.

[Two Substances then Two Natures]

2.1 If things have a single nature, they share a name and adjectival attribute; and if things share a name and adjectival attribute, then their subsistence implies an equality of substance. 2.2 The [Monophysites] do not consider the divinity of Christ to be equal in substance to his humanity; therefore the name and adjectival attribute [of Christ’s divinity and humanity] are not one; and if someone does not have a single name and adjectival attribute, then that someone’s natures are different.

[From Two Natures but not in Two Natures]

3.1 If the [Monophysites] say both that Christ is from divinity and humanity and that he is from two natures, and [if] it is their opinion that both ways of speaking mean the same thing; 3.2 how can they say that the divinity and the humanity together are in Christ after the union, 3.3 [but] it is not incumbent upon them from the principles which they have set down to say that there are two natures in him, since the meaning of these two concepts is one?

4.1 If they say that Christ is from two natures, they say that he is from divinity and humanity. 4.2 If they say that he is from divinity and humanity, then it is incumbent upon them to say that he is two natures, for even they will not deny the divinity and the humanity after the union. 4.3 Since they do not deny the divinity and the humanity, it is incumbent upon them likewise not to deny the two natures after the union.

1 Called “Theodosians” after Theodosius, the Patriarch of Alexandria (sedit 535-566). It was he who oversaw the establishment of a separate Monophysite hierarchy by his consecration of Jacob Baradeus in 542/43. Active in controversy with Chalcedonians (as well as with Julianists and the so-called Tritheists), Theodosius represented the theological leadership of the Monophysites following the death of Severus.

2 As was noted above, the first of Leontius’ thirty chapters is not present in the Arabic translation. For ease of reference, the chapters were numbered in accordance with the Greek. In this chapter Leontius argues from Christ’s divinity not being homoousios with his humanity to there being two separate natures in him.

3 Kalimah wa-nisbah (“name and adjectival attribute”) is used to translate the single Greek word ὄ λόγος — a free but accurate representation of the original.

4 In chapters 3-6 Leontius turns his attention to the Monophysite formula that Christ is from but not in two natures, arguing that they ought to grant two distinct natures in Christ after the union, if they are willing to grant that the natures are in him without confusion after the union.
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[10، 11] إنَّ كانت الطبيعة الواحدة في المشابي، في الجوهر تدل على أنَّ النَّار في المشابي، فكيف لا تكون الطبيعة في الجوهر مختلطة، بل ترجع إلى واحد؟

4.4 And if they deny the two natures after the union, they have denied the divinity and the humanity after the union.

5.1 If they know what comes together in Christ after the union and they say that it is not confused, and [if] in their opinion what comes together [in Christ] is two things; how do they not know that the two things which are not confused in the union are two things after the union? 5.2 If they do know that, why do they not confess it? 5.3 And if they do confess it, why do they not number what they confess? 5.4 How will they not number the property of the nature which they know to be unconfused after the union? 5.5 Saint Basil has said: “What they confess, they must number.”

6.1 If they say that Christ is from two natures and do not go on to say that Christ is two natures (for they both say and do not say that Christ is from them); then they must tell us how the constitution of Christ can be from them and they do not consider that Christ is in them, 6.2 for if what Christ is from is not in him, then what Christ is from is either not in another or is in another. 6.3 If it is in another besides him, then let them tell us in whom it is aside from him.

[Number]§

7.1 If in the case of two things equal in substance the “one nature” points up an agreement of essence, how then are two things different in substance not different, but instead imply one [nature]? 8.1 If in all respects number gives rise to division and separation, then number is the cause of separation and separation is not the cause of number. 8.2 Of necessity this implies one of two things – either united things are not numbered or numbered things are not united.

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6 For the phrase “for they both say and do not say that Christ is from them”, cf. the Greek original (99.11-12 [1904A]): ἐκ τούτων μὲν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα λέγουσι τὸν Χριστὸν.

7 “Not in another” and thus no where.

8 In chapters 7-8 Leontius turns to number. In ch. 7 he argues that the number “one” in and of itself does not indicate an identity of substrates and thus that the number “two” does not necessarily indicate a separation of substrates. In ch. 8 he further argues that it is not the number that causes division: to assume that it does leads to all sorts of untoward implications.

9 The protasis is positive in the Arabic version but negative in the Greek, excepting mss ACD and V (ante correctionem). Irtifāq al-dhāt (“agreement of essence”) is intended as a translation of ταυτότητα τῶν ὑποκειμένων (99.16 [1904A]).

10 The Arabic version completely changes the sense of the Greek, substituting “but instead imply one [nature]” for “but instead implies something separated”.
[8,3] وكيف لا يكون هذا من التضخكات، أن يدفع إليّ العدد هذه من السلطان، والعدد إذا شاء أن يدفع كمية ما يدفع، لا كيف؟ [9,1] وإن كان اتحاداً واتحاد من الأشياء المشابهة، وكان المضاف إياً يكون معاً ودائماً، [9,2] فالاتحاد المتعدد موجود إذا معاً ودائماً، ومنى زال المتعدد. فقد زال الاتحاد بلا شك.

[10,1] إن كان العدد يفصل بلا شك بواجب المعدودات، فليس عدد هذه الطبقات وحده يفصل إحدى هائتي الطبيعية 16 من الأخرى، بل عدد الخاصيّين يفعل مثل ذلك. [15,2] ك كيف يعرفون خاصيّين ولا يلزمهم من ذلك ما الزمُوه نقوم به في الطبيعية؟

[11,1] إن كان الأمر في تدبير سيدنا ومخلصنا سبوع المسيح الذي أناه في تجسده بعكس الأمر في الثالوث، على رأي القديس غريغوريوس، وكنا نعرف في الثالوث ثلاثة أقانيم ترمز إليها طبيعة واحدة، كيف لا نقول في المسيح طبيعية واحدة وأقنوم واحداً؟


ب: إلى
17 ب: الطبيعية
18 ب: الطبيعية
19: وأقنوم واحد: وأقنوم واحد.
8.3 And how is this not absurd, that number be granted such power, in that number is only capable of qualifying the quantity of what is numbered, not the quality?

[The Category of Relation]\(^{11}\)

9.1 If things which are united and union itself are among the things which are relational\(^ {12} \), and [if] further something relational is only [so by being] with [something] and [by] continually [existing]; 9.2 then union and the united exist [by being] with [something] and [by] continually [existing], and when the united passes away\(^ {13} \), union without doubt [also] passes away.

[Number Again]\(^ {14}\)

10.1 If without doubt and by necessity number divides things which are numbered, then it is not the number of these natures alone which divides one of these two natures from the other, rather, the number of the two properties does the likes of that. 10.2 How then do they confess two properties and it is not for that reason incumbent on them [to confess] what they force upon themselves concerning the two natures?

[Gregory of Nazianzus]\(^ {15}\)

11.1 If the state of affairs in the economy of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, which he brought about in the incarnation, is “the opposite of the state of affairs in the Trinity”, in the opinion of St. Gregory\(^ {16} \), and [if] we recognize in the Trinity three hypostases which we refer to a single nature; how do we not say that there are two natures and one hypostasis in Christ? 11.2 This second [expression] is certainly the opposite of the first.

\(^{11}\) In this chapter Leontius applies the Aristotelian category of relation to the situation of the incarnation, arguing from the union of natures in Christ being relational to the impossibility of those same natures becoming confused.

\(^{12}\) For the category of relation in Aristotle, cf. Cat. 1b25, 6a36-8b24. One should compare the Arabic version of the Categories, where πρὸς τῖ is also translated as ἴδιαφ.

\(^{13}\) “Passes away” in the sense that the united entities become confused with one another.

\(^{14}\) Leontius looks again at number, arguing that if it is capable of introducing division, one must go on to assert a division of properties and thus two natures.

\(^{15}\) In the following three chapters Leontius turns his attention to a number of famous passages in Gregory of Nazianzus’ first letter to Cledonius (the authority of which would equally be accepted by the Monophysites) and argues from Gregory’s statements to the truth of the Chalcedonian confession of two natures.

\(^{16}\) Gregory of Nazianzus, Epist. 101, ad Cledonium, 4 (ed. P. Gallay, 44.15-16; PG 37, col. 180A-B).
إن كان قولنا: «آخر وآخر» يدل على الأفانيم (بحسب رأي القديس)
جريغوريوس المقدّم ذكره (الثالوث)؛ فقولنا: «شيئاً آخر وشيئاً آخر» يدل على طالع.
ومن ناحية الباطل في ذكر الثالوث، فينفي أن يكون الثاني مقولاً على الطليعتيّين. ثم في
سيدنا المسيح. فإن كان الثاني مقولاً على سيدنا والله يسوغ المسيح، فالطليعتان إذا في موجبثران، من حيث أن القول الثاني مقول عليه.
إن كان قولنا: «شيئاً آخر وشيئاً آخر» دالاً على الطالع، وكان الأول منها
في لاهوت المسيح ونasoته صادقاً، إذ: «كانت اللاهوت، شئاً ونasoته، شئاً شئاً».
فصدقت الثاني (الذي هو قولنا) إن ذلك دليل على الطالع، واجباً.
 إن كانت الطبيعة البسيطة لها ذات غير ذات المركبة، وكانت طبيعة
الكلمة البسيطة طبيعة واحدة؛ فطبيعة المسيح، التي هي مركبة عندهم، ما سبيلها أن
تكون طبقة واحدة، إذ كانت البسيطة التي تدل على طبيعة واحدة، غير ذات المركبة.
إن كانت البسيطة عندهم ومركبة بدلان على طبيعة واحدة؛ فتابعونا الفرق
بين طبيعة المسيح البسيطة والمركبة، عندهم ما هو.
12.1 If our saying “one person and another person”\(^{17}\) points to the hypostases, in the opinion of St. Gregory (the aforementioned one, the theologian)\(^{18}\); then our saying “one thing and another thing”\(^{19}\) points to the natures. 12.2 And [if] we use the first [expression] when mentioning the Trinity, then it is necessary that the second [expression] be said of the two natures in our Lord Christ. 12.3 And if the second [expression] is said of our Lord and our God Jesus Christ, then the two natures are therefore two existing things in him, in view of the fact that the second saying is said of him\(^{20}\).

13.1 If we say “one thing” and “another thing” pointing thereby to the natures\(^{21}\), and [if] the first of these is true with regard to the divinity of Christ and his humanity, since the divinity is one thing and his humanity another thing\(^{22}\); 13.2 then the second [expression] is true (which is what we say), [to wit], that [expression] is necessarily a reference to the natures\(^{23}\).

[The One Composite Nature]\(^{24}\)

14.1 If a simple nature is essentially different than a compounded [nature], and [if] the simple nature of the Word is [but] one nature; then the nature of Christ which in their view is compounded cannot be one nature, since the simple, which indicates a single nature, is not compounded\(^{25}\). 14.2 And if, as they think, the simple and the compounded [both] point to a single nature, then let them show us the difference

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\(^{17}\) “One person and another person” (\(\text{\`a}kh\ wa-\`akh\)), for the Greek expression \(\text{\`a}ll\omega\zeta\ kai \text{\`a}ll\omega\zeta\).

\(^{18}\) Gregory of Nazianzus, Epist. 101, ad Cledonium, 4 (ed. P. Gallay, 44.6-46.2; PG 37, col. 180A-B).

\(^{19}\) “One thing and another thing” (\(sh\`ay\ `akh\ wa-
\`sh\`ay\ `akh\)), for the Greek expression \(\text{\`a}ll\omega\ kai \text{\`a}ll\omega\).

\(^{20}\) The apodosis of ch. 12.3 is rather periphrastic.

\(^{21}\) The first half of this compound apodosis (“if we say ‘one thing’ and ‘another thing’ pointing thereby to the natures”) is almost unrecognizable as a translation of the Greek: \(\varepsilon\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\omicron\ \tau\omicron\ \\`a\ll\omega\ \gamma\iota\ \phi\omicron\omicron\varepsilon\iota\ \varepsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\iota\nu\kappa\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \phi\omicron\omicron\iota\nu\ \\`a\ll\eta\ \varepsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\iota\nu\).

\(^{22}\) The phrase “since the divinity … another thing” is added by the translator.

\(^{23}\) The whole of this chapter is periphrastic and almost unintelligible.

\(^{24}\) In the next two chapters Leontius takes up the Monophysite technical expression \(\mu\iota\ \phi\omicron\iota\nu\iota\sigma\varsigma\ \sigma\iota\nu\theta\omicron\varepsilon\tau\omicron\zeta\), arguing in ch. 14 that it is subject to logical inconsistency in Monophysite usage, while in ch. 15 he attempts to discern just what the Monophysites mean by that expression, concluding either that it is superfluous or that it refers to a compound that is no longer God or Man.

\(^{25}\) This last clause (“since the simple … not compounded”) has been added by the translator in an attempt to clarify the logic of what has preceded.
[15.1] إنَّهُ في الأسماء والأفعال ما لفظه جمع ومعناه معيَّنٌ واحدٌ، مثل قوله
في اللغة اليونانية "بيتاً" وفي اللفظ جمع ومعناه اسم مدينة واحدة؛ [15.2] وفيه
يعكس ذلك، ما لفظه لفظ واحد ومعناه معيَّنٌ الجمع، مثل قولهن "جيشه" و
"شعبة" و "مدينة"، فإنَّ هذا الأسماء لفظها لفظ واحد، وكل واحد منها يشتمل
معناه على جماعة. [15.3] وسبيلهم أن يعرَّفونا وأتّهم في ذكرهم الطبعة المركَّبة.
[15.4] هل رأيهم بأي الآباء عندهم في قولهم "طبعة مُنْتَبِهة" و "طبعة مُضَعَّفة"؟
[15.5] فإنَّ كان الأمر عندهم كذلك، فليس لثابتهم على أنَّ للطبعة الواحدة وجه،
إذا كان، إذا ما ذكروا طبعة مُنْتَبِهة "؟ فقد دلّلنا على طبيعته. [15.6] وما سبيلهم
بعد هذا أن يحيدوا عن التصريح بالطبيعتي، إذ كانوا بمفهوم الطبعة المركَّبة قد دّلّوا
على أنها غير واحدة. [15.7] وإن كان عندهم أن قولهم طبعة مركَّبة ليس معناه معنٍ
جمع، بل معنى واحد، وكان قولنا طبعة بسيطة أيضاً معناه معنى واحد (فَلمَّا لنا ذكر
طبعة مركَّبة، إذا كان لا تستند بذلك على أكبر مما تدل عليه الطبعة البسيطة في
التوحيد)، فدلّ أن معنى المركَّب ومعنى البسيط على ما قد ذكَّره قولهم عندهم) واحداً.
[15.8] وإن كان رأيهم في الطبعة المركَّبة غير هذين المعنيين "؟ ذكرناها.
between the simple nature of Christ and the compounded, what it is in their view.26

15.1 Among nouns and verbs [there are some] whose form is plural and [whose] meaning is singular, as when we say “house” in Greek27 — in form plural and in meaning the name of a single city28. 15.2 And vice versa, there are some whose form is singular and [whose] meaning is plural, for example, “army”, “people”, and “city” — the latter have a singular form, but each of them implies in its meaning a plurality29. 15.3 They must tell us what they mean when they mention “the composite nature”. 15.4 Do they mean what our fathers meant when they spoke of a “dual nature” and a “double nature”? 15.5 If such is the case with them, then they have no right to adhere to the proposition that the one nature has a [single] aspect30, since when we make mention of a dual nature, we point to the two natures. 15.6 Furthermore, they cannot avoid the declaration of the two natures, for when they speak of a composite nature they have [already] pointed out that it is not single. 15.7. If they think that their expression “a composite nature” does not have a plural meaning, but a singular meaning, and [if] our expression “a simple nature” also has a singular meaning (for when we speak of a “composite nature”, we do not thereby intend more with regard to unity than is implied by the expression “simple nature”31); then this implies that the meaning of the composite [nature] and the meaning of the simple [nature] is one, according to what their own words have demonstrated32. 15.8 And if their opinion with regard to the composite nature is not like the two which we have just mentioned, then they have forged for

26 In the apodosis of this condition, the translator totally misses the point of Leontius’ Greek, wherein he asks his opponents to explain the difference between the incarnate nature of Christ which is composite over against the simple nature of God the Word (100.22-23 [1905A]: τὴν διάφοραν τῆς συνθέσεως κατ' αὐτὸν Χριστοῦ φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς τοῦ Λόγου φύσεως).
27 It is not entirely clear what the translator is doing here. Μέσον (“house”) may here bear the meaning “tent” and thus be an attempt to translate the παρεμβολή (“encampment”) of the Greek original. Note also that he does not attempt to translate Leontius’ other example (100.25 [1905A]: Θῇβαι).
28 The clarification/repetition (“in form … single city”) is added by the translator.
29 The whole of this sentence is not found in the Greek.
30 In the apodosis, the translation does not reflect the sense of the Greek (101.4-5 [1905A]: χώραν οὔκ ἔχει προσκεκλήθαι τῇ συνθέσεως φύσει τὸ μίαν αὐτήν ὀνομαζεῖν).
31 The parenthetical sentence (“for when we speak … the expression ‘simple nature’”) has been added by the translator.
32 The translation of 15.7 is fairly periphrastic: it nonetheless accurately represents the original.
فقد اختلقوا لقوهم طبيعة مخلّطة متهجّهة، مثل طبيعة البُغَال الَّتِي ليست في أصول الطَطَاع، ومثل إبتداع اليونانيين البدين في الحيوانات الكثيرة الصور.
[16:1] إنَّا كُوننا طبيعة الكلمة الإله الواحدة المتجَّسةً [ضدّاً] لقولنا طبيعَة متَحَدثِين، فالضوء نُدَعَّوَنَا إلى أحد خصائصَنا، إِنّا إنّا كُننا الجسد بغير طبيعة ولا يكون له طبيعة جسد، وإذا لا يقال عنه إلاّ جوه. [16:2] ففي خارجو أن ما شاؤوا من الخصائص في الكفر، إِنّا إنّا كُننا هذه الطبيعة ليست جسماً، وإذا انّا كُننا لا يقال في الطبيعة إلاّ جسماً.
[17:1] يقول النَّبِيُّ ﷺ: "الطبيعة الواحدة للكلمة الإله متجَّسةٌ فهٍّ في ثلاثة مُعانيٍّ.
themselves a confused and fake nature — a nature like that of mule, which has no roots in nature, and like those novel animals invented by the Greeks which have many forms.

[The One Incarnate Nature of God the Word]34

16.1 If our saying “one incarnate nature of God the Word” is the opposite of our saying “two united natures”, then one of two things are necessarily implied: either the flesh does not exist by nature and has not the nature of flesh, or one cannot say of it that it is substance. 16.2 Let them choose which of the two impious implications they wish: either this nature is not flesh, or one cannot say of [this] nature that it is flesh.

17.1 To say “one incarnate nature of God the Word” has three possible meanings. 17.2 First, after the incarnation there is one nature (i.e., a [mere] image of the flesh), thus it is [like] the nature of a brass statue, for when we mention such and such [a statue], that it is a single nature and [that] it is like [many] things, we [still] only mean that the nature of the brass is one, since nothing other than brass is to be found in it. 17.3 Second, the mention of the single nature is [meant to imply] an alteration of substance, as if we said that the nature of the Word has changed into flesh, as you say of the nature of water, when it has been altered into stone, that it is stone. 17.4 Third, if you [mean to] say “one nature of the Word, except that it is with flesh”, then to mention the flesh points to the other nature which belongs to the flesh, [the other nature] which the nature of the Word put on, thus becoming incarnate. 17.5 If what they say concerning the one nature accords with the first two kinds [of meanings], then their impiety is manifest and they have entered into the sect of Apollinaris and Eutyches.

33 Mules, it will be remembered, are the hybrid offspring of a male donkey and a mare.

34 In chapters 16-18 Leontius turns to the Cyrillian formula μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεπαρκομένη, showing that Monophysite attempts to appropriate it lead to a host of logical problems.

35 The last possibility (“one cannot say of it that it is substance”) is intended to render the phrase ἡ οὖσαν μὴ λέγεσθαι ὄπερ λέγειν (101.17-18 [1905C]). The translator seems, however, not to have understand Leontius’ meaning, to wit, “that, although it is flesh by nature, it is not so called”.

36 The point of this tangled and opaque argument (which is only very loosely paralleled in the Greek) is that a statue, even though it may take on various shapes, still has only a single nature, that of brass. So also with regard to the incarnation (on this interpretation of the formula): Christ takes on the shape of a human being, while remaining only divine, implying that the flesh is a mere image.

37 The Arabic translation of this chapter is very periphrastic, but for the most part faithful to the sense of the original. Furthermore, Greek 102.3-5 [1905D] is not translated.
إنَّ الطَّبِيعَةَ الْبَسِيَّةَ لَيْسَت في الْجِوْهَر مَساوِیَةً لِلْمِرْکِبَةِ. [۱۹،۱] وإذا
كانت طَبِيعَةُ الْأَبِ بِبَسِيَّةٍ كَانَت طَبِيعَةُ الْأَبِ مِرْکِبَةً عَنْدَهُم۱۴، فَلِبِس الْأَبٌ عَلَى هَذِهِ الْمَقْدُومَةَ لِلْأَبِ فِي الْجِوْهَر مَساوِیَةً. [۱۹،۳] مَساوِیَةً وَلَكِنْهُم۱۵ يَظْهَرُونَ فِي قَوْمِ إِنَّ الْمِسْحُ لِلْأَبِ فِي الْجِوْهَر مَساوِیَةً، وَلَنَا أَيْضاً فِي الْجِوْهَر مَساوِیَةً. [۱۹،۴] فَلِبَعَفْوَانَا إِذَا إِنَّهُم۱۵ يَمُكِنُ فِي طَبِيعَةِ الْمِسْحُ هذِهِ الْأَنْبِي ي۱۴۵ عَنْدَهُم۱۵ مِرْکِبَةً أَنْ يَكُنْ الْمِسْحُ بِهَا كِلَّهَا لِلْأَبِ فِي الْجِوْهَر مَساوِیَةً. [۱۹۰۵] إِذَا كَانَ ذَلِكَ، إِذَا فَقِد صَرْنا وَهُنَّ أَيْضاً لِلْأَبِ مَساوِیَةً. [۱۹،۶] إِنَّهُم۱۴۵ قَالُوا إِنَّ طَبِيعَةِ الْمِسْحُ الْواحَدَةَ لَيْسَ كِلَّهَا لِلْأَبِ فِي الْجِوْهَر مَساوِیَةً وَلاَ كِلَّهَا أَيْضاً لِلْأَبِ فِي الْجِوْهَر مَساوِیَةً، فَقَدْ بَيْنِي إِنَّ يَكُنْ بِعْضَهَا لِلْأَبِ فِي الْجِوْهَر مَساوِیَةً وَنَقْصُهَا الأَخْرَجْنَا فِي الْجِوْهَر مَساوِیَةً. [۱۹۷] وَصَوْرَتَ الطَّبِيعَةِ الْواحَدَةَ (عَلَى حَسْب رَأِيِ هَذَا) شَبَهُنَّ وَتَقَسَّمَتْ، وَصَارَ بَعْضُهَا مَساوِیَةً لِلْأَبِ فِي الْجِوْهَر وَبَعْضُهَا
18.1 As for the definition of “the nature of the Word”, they add to it, that it is united with “a body animated by a soul that is rational and intelligent”\(^{38}\). 18.2 How then do they mention the definition of this nature, but refrain from naming it? 18.3 Or how do they name each of the two natures, but then refuse to number it? 18.4 It is necessary for them to tell us that, and yet they neither know nor distinguish [between] what helps them in the argument and [what] contradicts them!

[Christ’s Double Consubstantiality]\(^{39}\)

19.1 A simple nature is not of the same essence as a composite [nature]. 19.2 If then, according to the [Monophysites], the nature of the Father is simple and the nature of the Son is composite, then on this supposition the Son is not of the same essence as the Father. 19.3 And yet, they make a pretense of saying that Christ is of the same essence as the Father, as well as [that he is] of the same essence as us. 19.4 Therefore, let them inform us whether it is possible — granted this nature of Christ which they think to be composite — that Christ by [this] whole [nature] be of the same essence as the Father\(^{40}\). 19.5 But if this were so, then we also would become equal with the Father. 19.6 And if they say that the single nature of Christ is not entirely of one essence with the Father, nor entirely of one essence with us; it follows that part of it is of one essence with the Father and the other half of it is of one essence with us. 19.7 Granted their view, the one nature of Christ becomes two things and is divided, part of it becoming of one essence with the Father and part of it [becoming] different, the [one] nature turning into another

and this, even though it is here that Leontius offers his objections to the third possible interpretation of the phrase “one incarnate nature of God the Word”.

\(^{38}\) Section 18.1 is intended as a one sentence summary of Greek 102.6-15 [1908A]. It is, however, so abbreviated that the sense of Leontius’ original argument is for the most part lost. In the Greek, after a brief digression on the meaning of contradictory propositions, Leontius argues that when we predicate of the “nature of the Word” that it united with “flesh animated by a rational and intelligent soul”, we thereby have applied to it the very definition of human nature.

\(^{39}\) In chapters 19-21 Leontius argues that the Monophysite assertion of Christ’s nature as composite (σύνθεσις) nullifies the doctrine of Christ’s double consubstantiality, making it impossible for Christ to be consubstantial either with the Father or with us.

\(^{40}\) After “of the same essence as the Father” the Greek adds καὶ ὅλην πάλιν ἡμῖν. The absence of the latter in the Arabic makes the argument rather more difficult to follow.
مختلفًا؛ وصارت الطبيعة صائبة إلى أخرى 18 تتمهم هم الطبيعة المركبة. [19,8] وهذا
شيءٌ بكفر أو بديلاريوس وآريوس في انتكاسهم تمامًا لاهوت المسيح وبشريته. [20,1] إن كان المسيح الواحد عندهم بعد الاتحاد إلهًا وإنسانًا، وكان كل واحدٍ من هذين إنًا هو الذي هو (أيّه إله الطبيعة وانسان بالطبيعة)؛ [20,2] فكيف لا يكون المسيح الواحد طبيعي، إذ كانت ذات اللاهوت ذات الناسوت ولا تكون أبدًا
شيئاً واحدا، ولا يكون الإله بالطبيعة إنساناً بذل الطبيعة بعينها أبدًا؟ [21,1] إن كانوا يقولون إن المسيح مساو في الجوهر بعد الاتحاد لشيء، ومساو في
الجوهر لشيء آخر (أيّه إله مساو للأب 10 ومساو لنا) ولستنا خن للأب مساوين؛ فإنّ من يكون لنا خن مساوياً 10 في الجوهر لا يكون أبدًا للأب مساوياً. [21,2] وإن كان المساو في الجوهر عندهم طبيعة واحدة، وكانت لاهوت المسيح عندهم لا تستوي في الجوهر بشريته، وكان من خان فجر يرغم عبد اختلاف طبيعي؛ فإن الغرية في الجوهر، إذا خصصت في طبيعة، فقد جعلت لها طبيعيًا، إذ 49 كانت المساواة في الجوهر (حسب المقدمة) طبيعة واحدة. [21,3] فين هذا، خلاف الطبيعة في الجوهر
[nature] which completes for them the composite nature. But this resembles the unbelief of Apollinaris and Arius in that they [too] denied the perfection of the divinity and humanity of Christ.

20.1 If they consider the one Christ after the union to be both God and man, and [if] each of these two is only what it is (scil. God by nature and man by nature); 20.2 how then is the one Christ not two natures, since both the essence of the divine and the essence of the human are present and these are never [just] a single thing, and [since] God is never by nature man by that nature in and of itself?

21.1 If they say that after the union Christ is of the same essence as one thing and of the same essence as another thing (scil. that he is of the same essence as the Father and of the same essence as us), and [if] we are not [of] the same [essence] as the Father; then surely whoever is of the same essence as us is never of the same essence as the Father.

21.2 If they think that [things] of the same essence are a single nature, and [if] they think that the divinity of Christ is not of the same essence as his humanity, and [if] someone with a difference of essence has thereby a difference of nature; then alterity in essence (since it arises in a nature) makes it two natures, since (according to the aforementioned reasoning) things of the same essence are a single nature. 21.3 From this it follows that alterity in essence produces two natures.

[Natural Properties]

22.1 Properties belong not to themselves, but rather to something other than themselves. 22.2 If the [Monophysites] think that the properties in Christ after the union are two properties; behold, the properties (i.e., [Christ’s] properties) are therefore two things. 22.3 Let them tell...
فلهذا ** خاصة** طبيعيّ، [٢٢٤٤] فقد ثبت الطبيعتان اللتان هاتان الخاصّتان
خاصّتاهما.

[٢٣٣١] فإن الفصل فإنما هو فصل لأنبياء مختلفة يفصل بعضها عن بعض.
والفصول المقسمة فإنما تميز الأشياء المنفصلة بالجحوش. [٢٢٣٤] فلا يعترّون أن كان
عندهم فصل يفصل اللاهوت من الناسوت بعد الاجتماع. [٢٣٤٥] فإن كان هناك
فصل، فهو جوهي، والجحوش، طبيعيّ. [٢٣٣٦] وإن كان الفصل طبيعيّ، فهو فصل
الطبقات. [٢٢٣٦] وإذا كان ذلك، فالطبقات إذاً وبعد الاجتماع مختلفة. [٢٣٣٧] وإذا
كان ذلك، فهؤلاء طبيعتان، إذ كان الفصل فيها فيها طبيعيّ.

[٢٤٤١] إن كان الفرق فيها بين الطبيعة والأقوام ٦ - على حسب القول الصادق
وما ذكره الآباء القدامى - إنما هو كممثل الفرق فيها بين الخاصّ والمعمّ، فطبيعة
الكلمة واحدة، ليس نسبتها إلى الجسم، بل إلى الأب، إذ كانت طبيعة الكلمة إنما
هي واحدة مع الأب. [٢٤٤٢] وإذا كانت واحدة مع الأب، فلا يذكرية واحدًا مع الجسم.

٦٦ ب: فلهما؟
٦٥ ب: الفنون.
٦٤ ب: القدامى.
us whether the two properties are properties of natures, and thus properties of two natures. 22.4 [If so], then the two natures are confirmed, the properties of which are these two properties.

[Natural Difference]47

23.1 Division applies only to things which are different, being divided one from the other. 23.2 Constituent divisions only distinguish things which are [already] divided in [their] essence. 23.3 Let them inform us whether it is their opinion that there is a division which divides the divinity from the humanity after the union. 23.4 If then a division is there, then it is essential; and [if this holds with regard to] the essence, then [such a division is also] natural48. 23.5 And if the division is natural, then it is a division of natures. 23.6 And since that is so, the natures are accordingly different, even after the union. 23.7 And if that is so, then here there are two natures, since the division between the two is natural.

[Ousia and Hypostasis]49

24.1 If, according to truthful reasoning50 and the opinion of the holy fathers, the difference between a nature51 and a hypostasis is only like the difference between the specific and the general52; then the nature of the Word is one, not with regard to the flesh, but rather with regard to the Father, since the nature of the Word is alone one with the Father. 24.2 And insofar as it is one with the Father, it is not one with the body. 24.3 And if it is not…53.

47 In chapter 23 Leontius turns his attention to division (διαφορά/φασι), arguing from its presence in Christ as a natural division to the presence in him of two different natures after the union.
48 In section 23.4 the translator expands Leontius’ argument, adding yet another condition.
49 In this chapter Leontius argues from the Logos’ sharing an essence with the Father to his possessing a nature that differs from that of the flesh.
50 Qawl (lit. “saying” or “speaking”) is rather unidiomatically used here to translate λόγος.
51 Here the Greek reads οὐσία rather than Φύσις.
52 The translator has reserved the analogy, for nature/essence = general, whereas hypostasis = specific.
53 The Arabic version here breaks off in mid-sentence; the rest of the Thirty Chapters (104.13-108.26 [1909B-1916B]) is lacking. In ms bā‘ the bottom third of the page is blank and one reads in the bottom left: wa-hādhā minmā wajadnā fi al-nuskhah (“and this is from what we found in the copy”). This scholion seems to be written in a different hand than as wrote the present treatise.